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Foucault saw himself as perpetuating the principle whereby philosophers
«enlighten» their present, which Kant introduced in his classic 1784 paper that
defines Enlightenment as an emancipation from self-imposed «immaturity». But
while Foucault may have tried to enlighten our present, he was hardly a figure of
the Enlightenment. Indeed he is often taken as the great modern counter-
Enlightenment philosopher and historian. More precisely, Foucault’s nominalism
is directed against the universalism of the Enlightenment [...] In reversing,
dispersing, and criticizing what was taken to be universal, Foucault attacks what,
in the present, has come to be regarded as the Enlightenment1.
One of the last writings Foucault was able to complete before his death in
June 1984 was an essay entitled «What is Enlightenment?». This was meant to
be delivered at the University of California, Berkeley in the spring 1984 as part of
a seminar on modernity and the Enlightenment whose participants would have
included Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Hubert Dreyfus and
Paul Rabinow. The seminar never took place, due to Foucault’s death, and the
essay thus became a sort of testament of Foucault’s stance toward the
Enlightenment and, more specifically, toward Kant’s answer to the question «Was
ist Aufklärung?» formulated in 1784 in the pages of the Berlinische Monatsschrift.
But Foucault’s interest in Kant’s answer to the question «What is
Enlightenment?» went back at least a decade. He had in fact composed an article
entitled «Qu’est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aufklärung]» which was delivered
as a lecture before the Société française de Philosophie in May 1978, and
devoted the opening lecture of a course at the Collège de France in 1983 to an
assessment of Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment and his attitude to the French
Revolution2. In these essays Foucault presented what may be called a qualified
defence of the Enlightenment, in particular, of its critical attitude to the present
which he termed a «philosophical ethos». In offering a qualified endorsement of
the Enlightenment «ethos» of critique, Foucault appeared to betray his earlier
understanding of the Enlightenment as the age that paved the way for the
«sciences of man», i.e. the sciences of discipline and normalization, of
surveillance and control of bodies and souls, of marginalization and exclusion of
the deviant, the abnormal, the insane. «In the history of the sciences», he wrote,
«it is a matter at bottom of examining a reason, the autonomy of whose structures
carries with it a history of dogmatism and despotism -a reason, consequently,
which can only have an effect of emancipation on condition that it manages to
liberate itself from itself [...] Two centuries later, the Enlightenment returns: but
not at all as a way for the West to take cognizance of its present possibilities and
of the liberties to which it can have access, but as a way of interrogating it on its
limits and on the powers which it has abused. Reason as despotic
enlightenment»3.
Judged against the tenor of this statement, Foucault’s later
pronouncements strike a discordant note. In his 1984 essay «What is
Enlightenment?» he characterizes it as a «permanent reactivation of an attitude -
that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of
our historical era»4. Not surprisingly, a number of commentators have explored
this tension or contradiction in Foucault’s attitude toward the Enlightenment, and
reached fairly similar conclusions. Habermas, for instance, ends his brief eulogy
of Foucault with the following observation:
Only a complex thinking produces instructive contradictions [...] He contrasts his
critique of power with the «analytic of truth» in such a fashion that the former
becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow from
the latter. Perhaps the force of this contradiction caught up with Foucault in this
last of his texts, drawing him again into the circle of the philosophical discourse of
modernity which he thought he could explode5.
Richard Bernstein claims that many responses are possible to Foucault’s
contradictory stance toward the Enlightenment, for example, that he changed his
mind, that he adopted a more conciliatory tone, that he was rewriting his own
history, and so on. Perhaps, he says, «we can give a different, more sympathetic
reading of what Foucault is doing», a reading that enables us to get a better
grasp of his critical project, but that still leaves us with a number of unresolved
problems, chief among which is the lack of an adequate evaluative perspective
from which to specify what is uniquely dangerous about modernity and its
techniques of normalization6. Thomas McCarthy, for his part, recognizes that
Foucault’s «belated affirmation» of the philosophical ethos of the Enlightenment
«signals important changes in Foucault’s understanding of his critical project»,
but claims that neither Foucault’s «social ontology of power», nor his later
concern with techniques of «self-fashioning» provide «an adequate framework for
critical social inquiry»7.
I would like in what follows to provide an equally critical but nuanced
perspective on Foucault’s attitude to the Enlightenment. For this purpose I will
offer a detailed examination and assessment of Foucault’s essays on Kant and
the Enlightenment, starting with his 1978 article «Qu’est-ce que la critique?»
ENLIGHTENMENT VERSUS GOVERNMENTALITY
The aim of this article was to examine the emergence in the early modern
era of a «critical attitude» in response to the development of a system of power
that Foucault called «governmentality». In 1978 and 1979 Foucault had given a
number of lectures on the question of governmentality at the Collège de France in
which he analyzed the development of a set of political strategies and techniques
that aimed at governing individuals in a continuous, regular and permanent
fashion8. These techniques and strategies of governmentality were the product of
two different conceptions of political power: the Christian model of pastoral rule
and the Greek model of the self-determining polis. Out of these two conceptions
there arose the rationale underpinning the modern doctrine of «reason of state»9.
Such a rationale entrusted political authorities with a power to survey, control and
discipline individuals which had previously been the prerogative of religious
authorities. Foucault’s studies on governmentality offered a historical genealogy
of those techniques of political control and surveillance that would eventually
culminate in the modern forms of disciplinary power so well documented in his
pioneering book Discipline and Punish. But, as we know from that book, each
form of power generates its own form of resistance, so Foucault’s account of the
emergence of governmentality involves at the same time an account of the
emergence of the specific form of resistance which this new form of power
instigates or makes possible. The lecture «Qu’est-ce que la critique?» is devoted
precisely to providing an account of the distinctive form of resistance to
governmentality. In this lecture Foucault argues that resistance to
governmentality did not take the form of an absolute opposition. The answer to
the question «how to govern?» which dominated political discourse in the early
modern era did not, in fact, take the form of «how not to be governed». Rather, it
crystallized around a set of more specific issues, such as: «how not to be
governed like that, by that, in the name of principles such as that, in view of such
objectives and by the means of such procedures»10. For Foucault, this attempt to
question or challenge the particular forms in which the «art of governance» is
exercised signals the emergence of the modern notion of critique -which Foucault
characterizes as «the art of not being governed in such a manner»11.
This questioning or resistance to governmentality is directed both at the
spiritual authority of the church and at the temporal authority of civil rulers: their
claim to speak with authority is met with a resistance which takes the form of a
questioning of their power to define the truth for the subject. As Foucault puts it,
«the focus of critique is essentially the bundle of relations which tie ... power, the
truth, and the subject»12. Thus, while governmentality subjects individuals to a
power that lays claim to truth, critique is «the movement by which the subject
gives itself the right to interrogate the truth with respect to its effects of power and
interrogate power with respect to its discourse of truth»13. Critique is thus best
characterized as «the art of voluntary inservitude» (an ironic and purposeful
reversal of the title of Etienne de La Boétie’s political tract of 1550, Le Discours
de la Servitude Volontaire), as «a thoughtful indocility» which aims at
«desubjectification» within the «politics of truth»14.
After having provided this account of the origins of the idea of critique,
Foucault turns to an examination of Kant’s definition of Enlightenment, a definition
that he considers very pertinent to the issue explored in the first part of the
lecture, namely, the mutual implication of critique and governmentality. Kant’s
definition of Enlightenment is as follows:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity
is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another.
This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of
resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of
enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own
understanding!15.
Four aspects of Kant’s definition are seen as relevant to Foucault’s own
discussion of the intertwining of critique and governmentality. First, the
Enlightenment is defined as the opposite to a state of immaturity or tutelage.
Second, this state of immaturity is seen as the incapacity to use one’s own
understanding without the guidance of another (heteronomy). Third, Kant
suggests a connection between an excess of authority, on the one hand, and a
lack of courage and resolution, on the other. Finally, the domains in which the
contest between a state of immaturity and one of enlightenment takes place are
those highlighted by Foucault in his discussion of the opposition of critique to
governmentality, namely, religion, law, and conscience.
Kant’s definition of Enlightenment thus bears a close affinity to the issues
raised in Foucault’s essay. Moreover, according to Foucault, Kant’s defence of
enlightenment was not blind to the interplay between critique and power. The
Enlightenment’s motto: «Sapere aude!» -have the courage to use your own
reason- was counterbalanced by the injunction, attributed to Frederick the Great,
to: «Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!» By
counterposing these two claims, and by accepting as legitimate the restrictions
imposed on the private use of reason, Kant seems to acknowledge the limits of
critique. The courage to know is at one and the same time the courage to
recognize the limits of reason. Such a reason finds its legitimate employment only
in its public use, by which Kant means the use «which anyone may make of it as
a man of learning addressing the entire reading public»16. And the interweaving
of argument and obedience contained in the quote attributed to Frederick II
indicates Kant’s awareness of what Foucault calls the «play of power and truth».
Obedience to the sovereign is made legitimate by being grounded on the
autonomy of reasoning subjects. The activity of critique is a play of power and
truth (of obedience and argument) insofar as it gives the subject the power to
determine itself, to retain its autonomy while acknowledging the authority of the
sovereign.
Having explored the links between Kant’s definition of Enlightenment and
his own conception of critique («the art of voluntary inservitude»), Foucault
considers, in the final part of the lecture, the fate these ideals underwent in the
nineteenth century. According to Foucault, the history of the nineteenth century
can be seen as carrying on the critical project which Kant identified with the
Enlightenment, but with critique now turned at Enlightenment itself. Three crucial
developments are seen as motivating this re-orientation of critique toward the
original ideals of the Enlightenment. First, the development of positivist science.
Second, the emergence of a teleological (viz. Hegel) and technocratic (viz. St.
Simon) conception of the state. Third, the binding together of positive science and
the state into a «science of the state»17.
Faced with these developments, can the enlightenment ideal of a critique
of arbitrary political power be sustained? Can the critique of governmentality be
effective once reason, in the form of positivist science, has been shown to be
intimately connected to the excesses of state power? Foucault identifies two
responses to this dilemma. The first, developed in Germany in the writings of the
Hegelian Left, Weber, and the Frankfurt School, takes the form of a critique of
positivism, scientism and instrumental reason, seen as the handmaidens of an
insidious form of power. The second, developed in France in the works of
historians and philosophers of science such as Cavaillés, Bachelard and
Canguilhem, takes the form of a critical inquiry into the factors conducive to the
emergence and eventual predominance of one particular form of rationality. Here
the question that is raised is what Foucault calls the «réciproque et l’inverse» of
the original aspirations of the Enlightenment, namely: «How is it that
rationalization is conducive to a desire for power?»18.
This question had also been at the centre of the Frankfurt School’s critique
of instrumental reason, and Foucault acknowledged the deep affinity that existed
between his genealogical inquiries and the work of the Frankfurt School19. Both
had been concerned with the question that Kant addressed for the first time in
1784 («What is Enlightenment?») and both could be seen as continuing the
interrogation of reason initiated by Kant. In the case of Foucault, such
interrogation must now take the form of «historico-philosophical» investigations
which examine «the relations between the structures of rationality that articulate
true discourses and the mechanisms of subjectification which are bound to
them»20. The question «What is Enlightenment?» invites now the question:
«What is it that I am, the me which belongs to this humanity, perhaps to this
fragment ... to this instant of humanity which is subjected to the power of truth in
general and of truths in particular?»21.
The aim of the «historico-philosophical» inquiries which address this new
question is, as Foucault puts it, to «desubjectivize philosophical questions by
recourse to historical content», and «to free the historical contents by an
interrogation of the effects of the power of this truth»22. These inquiries will
concern themselves with that extended epoch which constitutes «the moment of
formation of modern humanity», with «Aufklärung in the broad sense of the term,
of that period without fixed dates to which Kant, Weber, and others, make
reference, of those multiple entries by which it may be defined, such as the
formation of capitalism, the constitution of the bourgeois world, the establishment
of the state system, [and] the foundation of modern science with its correlative
techniques». Thus, to pose today the question as to «What is ‘What is
Enlightenment’?» is, Foucault concludes, «to encounter the historical problematic
of our modernity»23.
ENLIGHTENMENT AND REVOLUTION
Foucault’s 1983 lecture, translated in English with the title «Kant on
Enlightenment and Revolution», indicates a slight change of direction.
Enlightenment is no longer viewed as being closely tied to the idea of critique, as
exemplifying the attitude which had emerged in response to the techniques and
strategies of governmentality. Rather, the focus now is on the Enlightenment as a
period in history marked by a novel awareness of its own presentness and
singularity. Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment introduces «a new type of question
in the field of philosophical reflection», namely, «the question of the present, of
the contemporary moment» which is without precedent in the history of
philosophy24. In Kant’s essay, Foucault maintains, «one sees philosophy ...
problematizing its own discursive present-ness: a present-ness which it
interrogates as an event, an event whose meaning, value and philosophical
singularity it is required to state, and in which it is to elicit at once its own raison
d’être and the foundation of what it has to say» (KER (Kant on Enlightenment
and Revolution), 89).
Foucault now stresses the link between the new kind of philosophical
reflection inaugurated by the Enlightenment and the focus on modernity.
«Philosophy as the problematization of a present-ness», he writes, «the
interrogation by philosophy of this present-ness of which it is a part and relative to
which it is obliged to locate itself: this may well be the characteristic trait of
philosophy as a discourse of and upon modernity» (KER, 89).
Foucault also emphasizes the fact that with the emergence of the
Enlightenment there appears a new way of posing the question of modernity, «no
longer within a longitudinal relationship to the Ancients, but rather in what one
might call a ‘sagital’ relation to one’s own present-ness» (KER, 90). The
Enlightenment is, in fact, the first age which named itself the Enlightenment
(Aufklärung); in this sovereign act of naming itself «a cultural process of
indubitably a very singular character ... came to self-awareness» (KER, 90). The
Enlightenment is the first epoch which «names its own self» and which, rather
than simply characterizing itself against other epochs as «a period of decadence
or prosperity, splendour or misery», views itself as a period with its own special
mission and purpose (KER, 90).
Foucault then proceeds to examine Kant’s essay of 1798, The Contest of
Faculties, focusing on Kant’s discussion of the French Revolution. He argues that
there is a deep connection between the 1784 essay «What is Enlightenment?»
and the 1798 essay, insofar as both were concerned with exploring the meaning
of the present, of the contemporary moment. In 1784, he writes, Kant «tried to
answer the question put to him, ‘What is this Aufklärung of which we are a part’?
and in 1798 he answered a question which contemporary reality posed for him ...
This question was ‘What is the Revolution’?» (KER, 91).
Kant’s analysis of the French Revolution is pursued in the context of
attempting to answer the broader question «Is the human race continually
improving?» In order to answer this question, one had to identify an event in
human history that would indicate, or be a sign of, the existence of a permanent
cause which guides mankind in the direction of progress. Such a cause had to be
permanent in the sense that it had to be shown to be operative throughout the
course of human history. Hence the event that will enable us to decide whether
the human race is constantly improving must be a sign that is rememorative
(showing that the alleged cause of progress has been operative in the past),
demonstrative (demonstrating that it is active in the present), and prognostic
(indicating that it will also operate in the future). Only then will we be sure that the
cause which makes progress possible has not just acted at a particular moment
in time, but guarantees a general tendency of the human race as a whole to
advance in the direction of progress25.
Kant found the sign of such a progress in the event of the French
Revolution, an event which he identified not with «those momentous deeds or
misdeeds of men which make small in their eyes what was formerly great or
make great what was formerly small», but with «the attitude of the onlookers as it
reveals itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking
place»26. In the «universal yet disinterested sympathy» that the public openly
shows toward one set of protagonists, regardless of the cost it may carry to
themselves, Kant finds evidence of human progress. «Their reaction», he writes,
«because of its universality, proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain
character in common, and it also proves, because of its disinterestedness, that
man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one. And this does not
merely allow us to hope for human improvement; it is already a form of
improvement in itself, insofar as its influence is strong enough for the present»27.
In sum, it is not the success or failure of the Revolution, but rather the «sympathy
which borders almost on enthusiasm» with which it was received by the non-
participating spectators, that provides a sign that the human race is improving.
This sympathy cannot be caused, Kant says, «by anything other than a
moral disposition within the human race». This moral disposition manifests itself
in two ways: 1) the right of every people to give itself a republican constitution,
and 2) the aim of submitting to those conditions enshrined in a republican
constitution by which war may be averted28.
It is clear, as Foucault remarks, that these two elements are also central to
the process of enlightenment, that the Revolution «does indeed complete and
continue the process of Aufklärung», and that, to this extent, «both Aufklärung
and Revolution are events which can never be forgotten» (KER, 94). Or, as Kant
puts it:
Even without the mind of a seer, I now maintain that I can predict from the
aspects and signs of our times that the human race will achieve this end [of giving
itself a republican constitution which will prevent offensive wars], and that it will
henceforth progressively improve without any more total reversals. For a
phenomenon of this kind which has taken place in human history can never be
forgotten, since it has revealed in human nature an aptitude and power for
improvement of a kind which no politician could have thought up by examining the
course of events in the past29.
Moreover, anticipating the skeptical challenge, even if the intended object behind
the occurrence we have described were not to be achieved for the present, or if a
people’s revolution or constitutional reform were ultimately to fail, or if, after the
latter had lasted for a certain time, everything were to be brought back onto its
original course ... our own philosophical prediction still loses none of its force. For
the occurrence in question is too momentous, too intimately interwoven with the
interests of humanity and too widespread in its influence upon all parts of the
world for nations not to be reminded of it when favourable circumstances present
themselves, and to rise up and make renewed attempts of the same kind as
before30.
Thus, even if the Revolution may miscarry, its very existence attests to a
permanent human disposition or potentiality that cannot be ignored: it is the
guarantee for future history that the human race will continue to improve.
Now, just as Kant was not concerned to  provide a justification for the
success or failure of the French Revolution, but to interpret the significance of that
event for the present, so Foucault is not concerned with determining «what part of
the Revolution should be retained and set up as a model». Rather, as he puts it,
«it is to know what is to be done with that will to revolution, that ‘enthusiasm’ for
the Revolution, which is quite different from the revolutionary enterprise itself»
(KER, 95).
This statement is rather striking and liable to divergent interpretations. The
employment of a term such as «the will to revolution» to characterize the
enthusiasm displayed toward the event by sympathetic spectators bears strong
Nietzschean traces (the «will to revolution» as a synecdoche of the «will to
knowledge», and thus of the «will to power»). This is, in effect, how Habermas
interprets it in his eulogy of Foucault. «For Foucault», he writes, «the challenge of
the Kant texts he has chosen is to decode that will once contained in the
enthusiasm for the French Revolution, namely, the will-to-knowledge [...] Up to
now, Foucault traced this will-to-knowledge in modern power-formations only to
denounce it. Now, however, he presents it in a completely different light, as the
critical impulse worthy of preservation and in need of renewal»31.
This is indeed a legitimate reading of Foucault’s statement, but an equally
legitimate one is to stress that the «will to revolution» is not a synonym of the «will
to power», but a synonym of a «will to freedom» understood in a prosaic, non-
Nietzschean sense. Such a will to freedom would transgress against the limits of
the given and provide a space for the re-fashioning of subjectivity. I shall take up
this issue later in my discussion of Foucault’s essay «What is Enlightenment?»
For now it is sufficient to notice that Foucault saw revolution and revolt (the
example he used was that of the Iranian Revolution) as the means whereby
subjectivity «introduces itself into history and gives it a breath of life»32.
Revolution, in this sense, provides the opportunity for such a «will to freedom» to
interrupt the continuum of history and to refashion subjectivity in a novel way.
Foucault concludes his essay by noting that the two questions -»What is
Enlightenment?» and «What is the Revolution?»- are the two forms under which
Kant posed the question of his own present. They are also, he maintains, «the
two questions which have continued to haunt, if not all modern philosophy since
the nineteenth century, at least a great part of it» (KER, 95). But he is quick to
point out that it is not a question of preserving alive and intact the heritage of the
Enlightenment. «It is not the legacy of Aufklärung which it is our business to
conserve», he writes, «but rather the very question of this event and its meaning,
the question of the historicity of the thought of the universal, which ought to be
kept present and retained in mind as that which has to be thought» (KER, 95).
«The historicity of the thought of the universal»: here Foucault’s historicism
and nominalism come to full view. What matters for him is to relativize and
contextualize those historical factors that since the eighteenth century have
enabled the «thought of the universal» (of the necessary, the obligatory, the
transcendental) to prevail over the «thought of the singular» (of the contingent,
the arbitrary, the merely empirical), and to disqualify and subjugate the latter. The
urge to demystify the privilege accorded to the «universal» in the tradition
stemming from the Enlightenment is reasserted in the concluding paragraphs of
the essay, where Foucault draws a distinction between two critical traditions
initiated by Kant. The first, which he calls an «analytic of truth», is preoccupied
with defining «the conditions under which a true knowledge is possible». This is
the tradition initiated by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The second, which he
terms «an ontology of the present, an ontology of ourselves», is concerned with
the question: «What is our present? What is the contemporary field of possible
experience?» (KER, 96). This other tradition, which he sees emerging in Kant’s
essay on the Enlightenment and his reflections on the French Revolution,
abandons the search for those universal conditions that determine whether
sentences can be true or false, and concerns itself exclusively with the question
of actuality, namely, the question of our present and its field of possible
experience. In separating the «ontology of the present» from the «analytic of
truth» in such a radical fashion Foucault lays himself open to Habermas’s charge,
to wit, that he deprives himself of the normative standards that the former must
unavoidably borrow from the latter. A more generous reading, however, would
point out that the ontology of the present and of ourselves favoured by Foucault is
meant to open up a space for reflection, for a critical interrogation that
destabilizes our currently accepted ways of being, of doing, of thinking. It is to
these questions that Foucault turns his attention in the last of the essays he
devoted to Kant. Let us then look closely at what he has to say.
ENLIGHTENMENT AS TRANSGRESSION
In his 1984 essay «What is Enlightenment?» Foucault attempts to
formulate an answer to the very same question that was posed to Kant in 1784 by
the German periodical  Berlinische Monatsschrift. In his view, «Was ist
Aufklärung?» marks the entry into the history of thought «of a question that
modern philosophy has not been capable of answering, but that it has never
managed to get rid of, either ... From Hegel through Nietzsche or Max Weber to
Horkheimer or Habermas, hardly any philosophy has failed to confront this same
question, directly or indirectly» (WE (What is Enlightenment?), 32).
Foucault argues that Kant was not the first philosopher who had sought to
reflect on his own present. Throughout Western history philosophers have posed
the question of the present and, broadly speaking, their answers have taken three
forms:
1) The present was seen as belonging to an era of the world marked by
inherent characteristics (the present as a definite world era, exemplified in Plato’s
Statesman);
2) The present was interrogated in order to discover signs of a forthcoming
event (the present as a threshold, exemplified in St. Augustine’s The City of God);
3) The present was conceived as a point of transition toward the dawning
of a new world (the present as an accomplishment, exemplified in Vico’s La
Scienza Nuova).
Kant’s originality consisted in inaugurating a new way of thinking about the
relation between philosophy and the present. For Kant, the Enlightenment is
«neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are
perceived, nor the dawning of an accomplishment. Kant defines Aufklärung in an
almost entirely negative way, as an Ausgang, an ‘exit,’ a ‘way out’ [...] He is not
seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future
achievement. He is looking for a difference: What difference does today introduce
with respect to yesterday?» (WE, 34). Enlightenment is not conceived within the
framework of a progressive teleology of history. Rather, it is seen as a process
that releases us from self-incurred immaturity, a process that is at the same time
an individual task and obligation. It is «a process in which men participate
collectively» and «an act of courage to be accomplished personally» (WE, 35).
Enlightenment means the striving for maturity and responsibility (Mündigkeit). It
represents the moment «when humanity is going to put its own reason to use,
without subjecting itself to any authority» (WE, 38). And it is precisely at this
moment, Foucault remarks, stressing the connection between Kant’s essay on
the Enlightenment and the three Critiques, that «the critique is necessary, since
its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is
legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and
what may be hoped» (WE, 38). It is only when the legitimate employment of
reason has been defined, in both the theoretical and practical spheres, that its
autonomy can be assured. Thus, the critique is «the handbook of reason that has
grown up in Enlightenment; and, conversely, the Enlightenment is the age of the
critique» (WE, 38).
Foucault sums up his assessment of Kant’s essay by noting how this text
is located at the crossroads of «critical reflection» and «reflection on history». By
this he means not simply that it represents a reflection by Kant on the
contemporary status of his own philosophical enterprise. Rather, he means to
highlight the fact that «it is the first time that a philosopher has connected in this
way, closely and from the inside, the significance of his work with respect to
knowledge, a reflection on history, and a particular analysis of the specific
moment at which he is writing and because of which he is writing». In this
respect, «it is in the reflection on ‘today’ as difference in history and as motive for
a particular philosophical task that the novelty of this text appears ... to lie» (WE,
38, emphases added). Kant’s text on the Enlightenment thus provides the outline
of what Foucault calls «the attitude of modernity» (WE, 38).
It is at this point that Foucault’s essay takes a rather unexpected turn. He
claims that modernity should be seen as an attitude rather than as a period in
history -«a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by
certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling». Such an attitude is a
way of «acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of
belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks
called an ethos» (WE, 39). In order to characterize such an attitude or ethos,
Foucault turns to a discussion of Baudelaire’s essay «The Painter of Modern
Life». Baudelaire was one of the first to recognize that modernity meant an
awareness of the discontinuity of time, of a break with tradition, that it induced «a
feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment» (WE, 39)33.
In his essay Baudelaire defined modernity as «the ephemeral, the fleeting,
the contingent», and stressed that these elements must «on no account be
despised or dispensed with»34. One had no right to despise the present. Rather,
one had to adopt a certain attitude toward it, an attitude which recaptured
something eternal in the fleeting moment. As an example, Baudelaire cites the
work of Constantin Guys, who was able to «extract from fashion whatever
element it may contain of poetry within history, to distil the eternal from the
transitory»35. The attitude of modernity makes it possible, in Foucault’s words,
«to grasp the ‘heroic’ aspect of the present moment ... it is the will to ‘heroize’ the
present» (WE, 40). This «heroization» of the present, Foucault pointedly remarks,
is ironical. It does not treat the passing moment as sacred in order to preserve it,
nor does it involve collecting it as a fleeting and interesting curiosity. Rather, the
ironic heroization of the present is an act of transfiguration. Transfiguration «does
not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult interplay between the truth of what
is real and the exercise of freedom» (WE, 41). In this interplay, «natural» things
become «more than natural», and «beautiful» things «more than beautiful». It is
in this sense of a transfigurative interplay of freedom and reality that Foucault
characterizes the attitude of modernity, its ironic heroization of the present. «For
the attitude of modernity», he writes, «the high value of the present is
indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise
than it is ... Baudelairean modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to
what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously
respects this reality and violates it» (WE, 41, emphases added).
As we shall see, this is very much the attitude or ethos that Foucault
adopts vis-a-vis the present: simultaneously to respect it in its singularity and to
violate it in its claim to embody universality (whether such universality pertains to
the structure of reason, the logic of history, or the truths of human nature). His
stance is indeed one of transgression, one that he set out brilliantly in his preface
to Georges Bataille’s oeuvre in 196336. The same can be said of his attitude to
the self. Drawing again on Baudelaire, he claims that modernity is not simply a
form of relationship to the present; it is also «a mode of relationship that has to be
established with oneself» (WE, 41). «To be modern», he writes, «is not to accept
oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object
of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in the vocabulary of his
day, calls dandysme» (WE, 41). The deliberate attitude of modernity is tied to an
«indispensable asceticism». The dandy «makes of his body, his behaviour, his
feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art». Modern man does not
seek «to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who
tries to invent himself». He is constantly faced with the task of «producing
himself» (WE, 41-42, emphases added).
Foucault’s attitude to the present is thus closely tied to his attitude to the
self: just as the former must, ultimately, take the form of a possible transgression,
so the latter must take the form of an original production and invention of the self,
a self-fashioning or «souci de soi». There is no «human nature» to discover or
unearth, no «human essence» to be freed or unshackled. There is only the
constant, ever-renewed task to create ourselves freely, to pursue and give new
impetus to «the undefined work of freedom» (WE, 46).
This attitude or ethos of self-fashioning which is to be freely adopted by
each subject is certainly congruent with Baudelaire’s reflections on the dandy, but
is by no means congruent with Kant’s position. As Thomas McCarthy has
perceptively pointed out, «the representation of autonomy as aesthetic self-
invention eliminates the universality at the heart of [Kant’s] notion, the rational
Wille expressed in norms binding on all agents alike»37. Foucault was fully aware
of the distance separating his ethics of self-fashioning from any morality based on
universal criteria. As he declared in his last interview: «The search for a form of
morality acceptable to everybody, in the sense that everyone should submit to it,
strikes me as catastrophic»38. He never inquired whether a form of morality
based on universal principles freely agreed to  by all subjects, a morality that
provided a general framework of principles of justice within which individuals
would be free to pursue their own particular conceptions of the good life, would be
equally pernicious.
Foucault, in effect, wanted to adhere to an ethos of transgression and
aesthetic self-fashioning («Couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?» he
declared in a 1983 interview with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow)39 and
attempted to trace such a modernist ethos, via Baudelaire, to Kant’s reflections of
the Enlightenment. He wished to emphasize «the extent to which a type of
philosophical interrogation -one that simultaneously problematizes man’s relation
to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as
an autonomous subject- is rooted in the Enlightenment» (WE, 42). Preserving the
legacy of the Enlightenment, however, does not mean «faithfulness to doctrinal
elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude -that is, of a
philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our
historical era» (WE, 42, emphasis added).
Foucault goes on to offer a positive characterization of this ethos, after
having contrasted it negatively with what he calls the enlightenment blackmail of
being either for or against the Enlightenment, and with the conflation of
Enlightenment with humanism40. Such a philosophical ethos, he writes, «may be
characterized as a limit-attitude [...] Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and
reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits
knowledge had to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical
question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as
universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular,
contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?» (WE, 45). And, reiterating
the theme that has been at the centre of my reading of Foucault’s attitude to the
Enlightenment, he asserts that the point is «to transform the critique conducted in
the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a
possible transgression» (WE, 45, emphasis added).
This is a philosophical ethos with a marked affinity to Georges Bataille, to
Nietzsche, to the surrealist revolt against the stultifying bourgeois standards of
cognition and action, of knowledge and morality. It is an ethos of transgression
which revolts against all that is normative, all that which, in Foucault’s
understanding, leads to «normalization», to the regime of surveillance and
control, of disciplinary power. In its most extreme version, this transgressive
ethos, as Habermas has pointed out, «is addicted to the fascination of that horror
which accompanies the act of profaning, and is yet always in flight from the trivial
results of profanation»41.
Foucault did not, in the end, embrace this version of an ethos of
transgression. Although he did actively seek certain «limit-experiences»42 in both
his work and in his life, he was more concerned, ultimately, with testing the
«contemporary limits of the necessary» (WE, 43). In the context of his reflections
on Kant and the Enlightenment, this meant a reappraisal and reformulation of the
concept most central to the Enlightenment, namely, the concept of critique.
«Criticism», he tells us, «is no longer going to be practiced in the search for
formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into
the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as
subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying» (WE, 45-6). Such criticism is
«genealogical in its design» and «archaeological in its method». Archaeological,
«in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all
knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of
discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events»
(WE, 46, emphasis added). Genealogical, «in the sense that it will not deduce
from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it
will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think» (WE,
46, emphasis added). In this respect, criticism «is seeking to give new impetus,
as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom» (WE, 46).
Foucault is quite aware that this liberating criticism, this work done «at the
limits of ourselves», must be experimental, so that it may be able «both to grasp
the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise
form this change should take» (WE, 46). This criticism must also give up the hope
of ever acceding «to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may
constitute our historical limits» (WE, 47). The criticism of limits and the possibility
of moving beyond them are always limited; but rather than being a drawback, we
should acknowledge that this is what enables us to always begin again. Criticism,
in other words, must be constantly reactivated: only in this way can it provide an
impetus to our «undefined work of freedom».
We can see from these statements how Foucault’s ethos of critique
remains bound to certain limits even while it attempts to transgress or subvert
them. It is this which distinguishes his position from the one taken by the more
radical exponents of an ethos of transgression. And yet, it is the figure of
Nietzsche, rather than that of Kant, that provides the major source of inspiration
for Foucault’s notion of critique. As he puts it in the concluding reflections on the
meaning of that critical interrogation on the present and on ourselves inaugurated
by Kant:
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory,
a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it
has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the
critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
beyond them (WE, 50, emphases added).
EPILOGUE: NIETZSCHE OR KANT?
A few comments before closing. It is indeed a peculiar feature of the
discussion around Foucault’s work on Kant and the Enlightenment that a number
of American commentators have tried to interpret it as somehow a return to the
fold of a reasonable, accommodating community of «enlightened» inquiry.
Dreyfus and Rabinow, to take an example, characterize Foucault’s ironic stance
toward the present as one that encourages a «conflict of interpretations». They
suggest that «the archaeological step back that Foucault takes in order to see the
strangeness of our society’s practices does not mean that he considers these
practices meaningless. Since we share cultural practices with others, and since
these practices have made us what we are, we have, perforce, some common
footing from which to proceed, to understand, to act. But that foothold is no longer
one which is universal, guaranteed, verified, or grounded». It follows, therefore,
that «what makes one interpretive theory better than another ... has to do with
articulating common concerns ... while leaving open the possibility of ‘dialogue’,
or better, a conflict of interpretations, with other shared discursive practices used
to articulate different concerns»43.
This is what I would call the American «taming» of Foucault. In the hands of such
interpreters, Foucault’s transgressive stance begins to look «human, all too human». What
is missing in such a reading is Foucault’s nietzscheanism, for whom the project of
autonomy pursued by enlightenment thinkers from Kant to Habermas requires as a
corrective a strong dose of «inhuman thoughts». Foucault’s critical ontology of ourselves,
his ethos of transgression and aesthetic self-fashioning are indeed much closer to
Nietzsche’s vision of a transvaluation of values than to Kant’s notion of maturity
(Mündigkeit)44. Let us not betray Foucault’s inheritance by making him appear as,
ultimately, a child of the Enlightenment. As the «masked» and ironic philosopher that he
was, he deserves a better treatment from us.
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